INTRDUCTION
Openness, transparency and participation of the key players are all important for balanced decisionmaking in public issues. The research in public involvement in environmental decisions has lead to the conclusion that if relevant parties are not engaged in the decision-making process the policy will fail and the final decision 'might please almost no one and certainly infuriates many' (1, 2) .
International organisations in radiation protection have recognised this importance of prompt, open and transparent decision-making based on scientific facts and social judgements (3) . They have stressed that the basis of the decision must be perceived by the public and all relevant factors concerning the decision should be considered in a rational manner.
The consequences of an accident and the intervention will depend substantially on the event, the nuclide composition and on the season. The choice of intervention measures is also linked to the legislation and the economy of the country potentially affected. Because of this diversity, constraints and deficiencies in the consequence calculation tools in the past, the international organisations could not have taken into account all potential scenarios and all national circumstances. Recommended intervention levels have been based on holistic justification and optimisation of protective actions which most likely will protect the population in an appropriate way. Recommendations cover general and readily available countermeasures. The detailed planning has been left to national organisations in each individual country. This study is a response to the international call for national planning of protective actions in advance.
There are different persons and organisations that are responsible for the decision-making and for implementation of countermeasures in different phases of an accident. At the accident site the operator or licensee for the practice is in general responsible to control the event. The licensee may also be the first organisation to take initiative over off-site protective actions close to the site based on emergency plans. In the longer term the decision-making follows a country's administrative and legal system where the key players will have an important role and are making decisions on protective actions based on the available information. Key players or stakeholders comprise of responsible administrators and organisations, politicians as well as representatives of affected citizens and other actors who will and are likely to take part in decision-making in nuclear emergencies.
Later phase protective actions, which usually concern the society widely, are typically based on group decisions. The key players may have different views of the problem and of the relevant objectives. The players can be engaged in the decision-making process in various ways: advisory committees, planning cells, citizen juries, mediation etc. (1) . The involvement often increases the costs and complexity of the process. Individual participation methods have apparent advantages but some are also prone to shortcomings in certain problems that have led to criticisms (4, 5) . The working procedures and the efficiency of the use of time in the group meetings have also often been considered to be poor (2, 6) . The reported experience emphasises the importance of having clear procedures and methods for the decision-making process. All participatory methods do not articulate factors and judgements systematically and openly to be viewed by all the concerned people.
The second objective of this work is to develop methods to include key players' concerns and issues openly and equally in the decision. The approach applied employs a group process where responsibility is placed on the participants to assimilate information and to provide judgements. It has a clear structure based on decision analysis which provides a reasoning and learning framework that intertwines the beliefs, preferences and value judgements of the participants and achieves a transparent ranking of the strategies available.
Decision analysis techniques have been applied to solve societal problems such as environmental decisions and energy policies (1, 5, 7, 8) . The papers by Apostolakis and Pickett (9) , Hämäläinen (10, 11) , Keeney and von Winterfelt (12) and Keeney (13) are examples of studies of problems which also have connections to nuclear emergency management. In the field of nuclear emergency management decision analysis has been applied and facilitated workshops have been organised in different countries (14) (15) (16) . International organisations have demonstrated how justification and optimisation could be applied to planning protective actions (17) . For example, the IAEA aims to provide a benchmark against which national plans can be compared. The planning is based on a simple costbenefit analysis.
Here we report and summarize observations from different type of facilitated workshops. The first workshops followed a two-day decision conferencing approach. Other forms of decision conferences have also been suggested. For example, the spontaneous decision conferencing concept where the whole process can be accomplished in just a few hours and with minimal arrangements (6) . In problems involving experts and higher level policy makers time is always limited. Therefore, this more concise type of approach was seen practical. In planning in advance shorter workshops necessitates extensive background information and preceding preparatory meetings but this kind a process was seen to comply with conventional emergency management. Another approach is the interview technique in order to analyse the decision from the perspective of individual stakeholders.
This approach was also applied in this study.
FACILITATED WORKSHOPS AND STAKEHOLDER NETWORKS
The aim of the stakeholder network method is to collect information for decision-making and build up a permanent group of key players (18) . The objective of the facilitated workshops is to evaluate systematically the protective action strategies in such a way that all key players' concerns and issues could be considered openly and taken into account equally in the decision. An important outcome of the work is the creation of preconditions for participatory decision-making in a case of a nuclear accident.
A series of facilitated workshops have been organised in the Nordic countries to analyse protective The NKS organised the first two workshops held in Denmark and Sweden (19, 20) . The members of these workshops were local government officials, emergency planners and members of the radiation protection community from all Nordic countries. The two subsequent workshops and decision analysis interviews were carried out in a project within the fourth Framework Programme of the EU (21, 22) . The last workshop was funded by Finnish sources consisting of the Foodstuffs Industry Pool, the National Emergency Supply Agency and Valio Ltd (23) .
The work is based on case studies where key players were invited to consider a scenario of a hypothetical but realistic nuclear accident. It was assumed that a core-damage and containment leak accident had occurred at a nuclear power plant, leading to the contamination of the environment. To increase the reality, in most cases the accident sequence was taken from probabilistic reactor safety studies (PSA) performed by the NPP and STUK safety experts. It was also seen important that the current emergency management process of the administration was followed closely and that all the relevant key players were represented in the meetings. Experience gained from this work supports the view that facilitated workshops fit well in the planning phase in a decision-making process where key players having expertise in different areas analyse and evaluate alternative options to be given for final debate before formal decision making (Figure 1 ). Contacts were made and preparatory meetings held prior to the workshops. That would take place also in real emergencies. actions taken to protect the population were mentioned. A list of predefined attributes, the parties involved in decision-making and their duties were attached. All in all, the package was designed to contain all the relevant information necessary for the participants to understand the accident situation and to be able to make an informed decision on the countermeasures.
Decision Analysis has a major role in facilitated workshops. It guides discussions and offers a structured way to tackle the problem. An important feature is also that it allows participants to try different judgements to see the consequences without a final commitment. This allows them to reevaluate their opinions. The essence of decision analysis is to break down a complicated decision into small, manageable pieces that can be dealt with individually and then recombined logically.
The main phases in this one-step-at-a-time approach are: identification of relevant objectives and attributes, definition of action alternatives, assessment of the consequences in each action, judgement of the relative importance of consequences and analysing how sensitive the resulting ranking of actions is to changes in the values in consequence assessment and trade-off judgements (24) .
In the beginning of the workshops the list of attributes was presented and put up for discussion. The participants were urged to go through, revise, remove, add and redefine any attribute they wished.
Eventually the group agreed on the final set of attributes. The 'hard' attributes, i.e., number of cancer cases and costs were calculated in advance but the 'soft' attributes like social disruption and anxiety were directly rated during the workshops. A decision model was constructed and value or utility analyses were performed including sensitivity analysis with commercially available software. In the end of the workshops results were discussed.
DISCUSSION
The workshops aimed to elicit protective actions or strategies of which the scale, timing and duration were optimised in the given situation (optimisation in the sense of radiation protection).
Decision analysis has been developed to evaluate and identify the best strategy, i.e., to rank strategies. The justification embodies many value judgements and is implicitly included in the analysis. If all possible alternatives are considered the best ranked option should also be justified. In the traditional vocabulary we have thus found the optimal choice.
There should be a clear understanding of the countermeasures and factors affecting the decisions.
The timing, duration and target area of the actions, and the group aimed to be protected by the actions could be quite easily done and should be clearly defined. The objectives and attributes are not self-evident. In the workshops a lot of time was spent on defining the factors and the wording used in the value elicitation. Especially intangible attributes (anxiety, reassurance) can commonly be interpreted differently. It seems to be beneficial to define the attributes in advance in order to save time and to guarantee that all key players will understand their meaning in the same way. The definition of attributes in advance is against the standard way of using decision analysis and can possibly lead to such biases as availability or anchoring. However, nuclear accidents are rare and the key players are not very familiar with the radiological issues or the related terminology. We have found that in order to harmonise the discussion it is practical and efficient to start with a predefined, preliminary model of attributes. Our questionnaire confirmed that the participants were rather satisfied with the predefined attributes and ensured that all relevant factors were included in the model.
Open and transparent societal decisions are wanted both by the public and the elected officials (5) .
Our finding is that transparency and communication could be clearly increased by applying the structured approach of decision analysis. The process was made more fair and competent by involving the key players in the decision-making. Susskind and Field (2) have argued that face-toface negotiations among the key players could be the only way to settle the acceptable levels of risk.
However, the active participation of all the key players increases the cost and complexity of the process. The decision when to stop the analysis has to be made by balancing between accuracy, time and the resources available. There is no need for an analytical, participatory approach in recurrent decisions. People are accustomed to routine, repeated decisions where experience is available. However, rare, complex problems such as large nuclear emergencies could benefit from the use of facilitated workshops based on decision analysis.
It is important to learn to see where in the decision-making process decision support in the form of a workshop would be appropriate. Facilitated workshops do not fit comfortably in the decisionmaking process applied commonly nowadays to make the final decisions (20) . The reparation of a decision is divided into so many phases carried out by many responsible people that a single decision-making point can often not be identified. In a workshop a single decision-making point is presupposed. Commonly, elected officials and authorities do not participate in the consequence assessment or in the preparation or evaluation of a decision. They tend to wait, avoid the commitment to the outcome and take distance if necessary (1) . They are expecting prepared advice from the experts (9, 25) . Experience gained from this work supports the view that facilitated All the participants were not very familiar with this type of structured approach of the decision analysis and their opinions were divided about it. Some did not feel comfortable with the modelling tools and many had problems with the understanding of procedures. This kind a method had been seldom used in radiation protection and before the workshops there was no training for participants.
Only a few hours were spent on the issues and consequently there was not enough time to explain in detail all the decision analytical methods used during the workshops. More applications of the approach in appropriate problems are likely increase acceptance and understanding of techniques.
CONCLUSIONS
Decision analysis offers a suitable framework to aggregate values, beliefs and preferences that are held by the different interest groups. In our case studies it helped the participants to tackle the decision problem in a logical and efficient manner. For example, when constructing the attribute (or objective) hierarchy, the key players were encouraged to think of all the factors that are important to them in this context. An important achievement of the induced discussion was that many definitions were clarified and others revised. But probably even more important was that it created a common understanding of the decision problem. At a later stage, the participants were asked to consider explicitly the necessary trade-offs between the attributes. The given preference statements revealed the perceived importance of each attribute in relation to all the others. Thus, the analysis did not merely yield a ranking of the strategies investigated; it also revealed the reasoning behind. The primary benefit of a decision analysis is in the improved understanding and communication. This is important because decisions taken need to be explained and justified afterwards. In addition, it increased the level of commitment that is needed from all interest groups to carry out interventions agreed upon.
The experience gained strongly supports the use of the facilitated workshop method to tackle a decision problem that concerns many different key players. In our study the participants considered the workshops and the decision analyses to be very useful in the planning of the actions in advance.
They also expected a similar approach to be applicable in a real accident situation, although the suitability was not rated as high as for planning. The suitability of the method for the early phase of an accident was rated the lowest.
The pros and cons of the facilitated workshop method can be compared with the conventional approaches. They all provide create a network of key players to be better prepared for accident situation. 
